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Abstract 
 
“The agents of a prince regard the wealth of their master as inexhaustible; are careless 
at what price they buy; are careless at what price they sell; are careless at what expense they 
transport his goods from one place to another. Those agents frequently live with the profusion of 
princes, and sometimes too, in spite of that profusion, and by a proper method of making up their 
accounts, acquire the fortunes of princes.”  
 
Adam Smith (1776), The Wealth of Nations, Book V, Chapter II, Part I. 
 
 
 
High economic growth rates after World War II characterized both socialism and 
capitalism. There have been impressive results in the former socialist block, Western Europe, 
USA, and Japan. Apart from these models based on private (capitalist) and state (socialist) 
ownership, the fastest economic growth in the world for some time was recorded in former 
Yugoslavia under social ownership with no specific owner having full ownership rights. The 
issue of property rights despite being subject to comparative analysis, did not matter much. 
After social ownership was privatized, the effects were not only as they were expected to 
be, but the countries like those that emerged from former Yugoslavia have yet to cope and strive 
for greater efficiency than before. This paper looks at the redefinition or privatization of social 
ownership in successor states of former Yugoslavia, and identifies the causes of smaller effects 
than expected of this redefinition. 
 
 
Introduction 
The onset of the transition process in former Yugoslavia coincided with the 
economic and political disorganization in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the 
former Soviet Union. The development, speed and success of transformations and 
privatization depended on initial conditions, policies implemented, and the external 
environment (Pejovich, 1993; Ellman, 1994). In most cases these factors were 
interdependent and played a crucial role in the outcomes of transition and privatization 
in short to medium term. For example, the initial conditions of the Yugoslav transition 
path to a market economy were characterized by dramatic events and interethnic 
conflicts that led to the dissolution of the Federation, with political and economic 
consequences for the republics that became independent states.  
 
Political disorganization and distorted environment have always been an 
obstacle to transition and privatization. Policy makers tended to favor the worst scenario 
during transition rather than continue status quo of socialist economy. This then had 
adverse effects in the restructuring process as a result of dramatic economic decline 
(Roland, 1994). While this refers to the early transition period, it should be reminded 
that privatization has promised more than actually achieved even in a stable country 
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when it was implemented for the first time – the United Kingdom. The conclusion 
which Florio (2004) draw from a thorough investigation of the British experience from 
1979 to 1997 is that privatization has had smaller effects on overall economic 
performance and efficiency than the theory of property rights had established. 
Moreover, the British privatization being the first most important case in history was not 
a success as its proponents and policy makers were roaring. It was a selective success 
for the firms that came more efficient from their better position on the eve of 
privatization, and a failure in terms of social welfare.1  
 
The British and Western privatization, however, should be distinguished from 
CEE for two crucial reasons: first, the West privatized Publicly-owned Enterprises 
(POEs) as opposed to privatization of commercial enterprises in CEE; and second, 
privatization of POEs in Western countries may be referred to a reform within existing 
system, whereas in CEE and former Yugoslavia in particular, it was part of the bigger 
changes not only within the economy, but the society in general. 
   
To come out with an assessment on the impact of privatization in successor 
states of former Yugoslavia, the paper begins with a brief review of different types of 
property and their associated incentives with respect to efficiency. Section two outlines 
the reasons that led to privatization of public and state property. Similarly, the necessity 
of privatizing social property and the methods of privatization implemented in successor 
states of former Yugoslavia are discussed in section three. The section continues with an 
assessment of the impact of privatization methods on corporate governance and 
restructuring. Section four summarizes a number of causes leading to smaller 
privatization results than expected by grouping them as internal and external factors in 
separate subsections. Section five provides a summary and draws conclusions. 
 
   
 
1 “In some ways, this rift [the welfare impact of privatization] has distanced the United Kingdom from the 
social model of its European partners. No government in the European Union would have considered 
acceptable a doubling of the percentage of people living in conditions of poverty in less than two 
decades…..Britain’s economic system is now closer to the U.S. form of capitalism than to the European 
pattern, without the benefits of American technological leadership, entrepreneurialism, and international 
hegemony.” (Florio, 2004, p.363). 
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1. Different types of property as incentive to economic efficiency  
 
In broader terms, property as Waldron (1991) maintained, can be understood as 
a set or system of rules regulating the right to, and control of, material resources. In this 
way, the term property right is used in economics to denote the essence of the property. 
Every society has an institution or a body to enforce these rights and that is the state. 
The enforcement is made depending on political system of a country and the economic 
system it wanted to establish. Thus capitalist democracy enforced the right to private 
property as a foundation of market economy. Centralist socialism enforced the right to 
state property and planned economy. The self-management socialist regime as the 
institution responsible for enforcing the right to social property defined the means of 
production as socially-owned.2 That is, the society as a whole was supposed to be the 
owner of social assets (thus, social ownership). As such, social ownership had both 
similarities and differences with state and private ownership. 
 
Social property and social ownership is a relatively new category of property 
rights and their analysis is relatively new as well. Since it was introduced in former 
Yugoslavia in the early 1950s, no significant attention was paid to its analysis until 
Furubotn and Pejovich (1970) who believed that one could not present a satisfactory 
theory of the Yugoslav firm without an explicit reference to its property right structure. 
This was due to some of the specific features of this type of property rights, in 
particular: (i) enterprises were not allowed to own assets; and (ii) selling and buying of 
the firm’s assets only amounted to a transfer of the right to use but not the right to 
alienate or destroy those assets.  
 
A vast theoretical literature has evolved on comparative performance of different 
property rights. Coase’s (1937) article laid the basic foundations of allocation and use of 
property by the firm (its owner or management) and by someone else outside the firm 
such as the state. Interactions between allocation and use involve a relationship between 
 
2 When Yugoslav ideologists introduced self-management they did not know exactly how the system 
would operate since there was no theory about it. But even during its operation, the Yugoslav economists 
have not developed any theory, nor did they make any notable contribution to it. Self-management 
attracted the attention of Western economists who where the first attempting to create a theory of a Labor-
managed Firm (LMF) or the Workers’ Management, as the Yugoslav Socially-owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
were identified. The first article was published by Ward (1958), and then during the 1970s the interest 
grew among some economists from CEE such as Vanek (1970, 1977) and Estrin (1983). Horvat (1982) 
and to some extent Bajt (1988) were few exceptions among Yugoslav economists to have contributed to 
the theory of Workers’ Management. 
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master and servant or principal and agent of property. The principal (the state or 
society) may engage the agent (in former Yugoslavia they were the workers) to perform 
some actions on behalf of the principal, including full decision making authority 
delegated to the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
The central point of the theory of property rights is that the firm’s performance 
depends on objective function and incentives. State, social and private ownership are 
different in this respect. Private ownership has incentives to reduce costs and reap more 
market-based benefits compared to state ownership (Shleifer, 1998). Enterprise profit is 
allocated by its owners; private owners allocate their profit according to their wishes, 
state authorities allocate the profit of state enterprises, and the decision of the working 
collective or members of the company allocated the profit of Socially-owned 
Enterprises (SOEs).   
   
Since the pioneering article by Ward (1958), the analysis of the behavior of an 
SOE has been based on comparing its performance with that of a capitalist firm. Ward 
who coined the term ‘Illyrian firm’, considered it a less independent form of capitalist 
firm, and as such with the failures that makes it less efficient. Ward demonstrated that 
the SOEs would perform less efficiently than capitalist firms because, among other 
reasons, their response to a price increase (or decrease) is the opposite of the capitalist 
firm’s response. He also showed that in these firms investment pattern will be distorted 
in comparison with capitalist firms due to incentives of the working collective to 
maximize individual incomes. Such assumptions about the behavior of SOEs were 
based on competitive self-management for which Vanek (1970) created the most 
noteworthy general theory. Assuming perfect competition and the behavior of the 
system as a whole, Vanek along the line of Ward argued that a Labor-managed 
Economy (LME) will respond to aggregate demand by the change in prices rather the 
change in output and/or employment.  
 
As noted by Alchian and Demsetz (1973), it is more important for the society that 
economic choices what, how and for whom, are preceded by techniques, rules or 
customs which resolve the inefficiencies that arise from the use of scarce resources, i.e. 
define property rights clearly. In self-management socialism, ownership rights were 
politically imposed and the residual rights were used by the central authority to monitor 
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managers. Jensen and Meckling (1979) viewed as an adverse outcome the manager’s 
limited incentive to monitor and condemn workers in case of abuse or theft because s/he 
is elected by the workers who can dismiss him/her. This ambiguous role and actions by 
the Yugoslav principal (central authority) and agent (management of SOEs) was the 
underlying reason for some of the inefficiencies of social ownership. In the system of 
Workers’ Management which in its largest part seems to have been operating as a black 
box, the workers officially were declared and in fact they felt to be the true rulers of 
SOEs but hardly were; the role of the state and its agents was always significant (Lydall, 
1984). In theory, the Yugoslav workers were the agents of the state, though in practice 
the state played a double role (as principal and agent). Having in mind the labyrinth in 
which self-management operated, the Yugoslav economy could not be fully and 
competitive LME, which various authors used as an example to establish standard 
theories.  
 
Because of unclear property rights, resource allocation under social ownership was 
considered suboptimal. Regardless the theory, self-management in aggregate terms 
fared much well than capitalism and centralist socialism. At the beginning of its 
introduction it was lucky to enjoy a significant aid from Western countries.3 Any 
economic system with such a support would have recorded obvious results. But the fact 
that the fastest economic growth in the world in absolute terms continued for more than 
a decade after the aid was received, indicates that there were other determinants. Above 
all, the workers motivation for work through self-management and the enthusiasm of 
the Yugoslav communists expressed by the slogan ‘we’ and ‘they’ intimating a 
comparison of their socialist version with all Eastern block, were the factors of 
significant impact. Table below summarizes the results of self-management from 1953 
to 1965, the period which can be considered as its golden age. 
 
 
3 Western aid included capital transfers from the USA, Britain and France amounting to $425.8 million 
delivered from 1951 to 1954 (Dyker, 1990:24, op. cit).   
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Table 1.1:  Annual rates of growth in different economic systems (from 1953 to 1965) 
                Systems 
Indicators 
Self-management 
socialism  
Centralist (state) 
socialisma) 
Capitalismb) 
Output 11.8 
(10.3)c)  
8.7 
(5.9)d) 
7.1 
(3.7)f)   
Capital  7.5 
(7.8)c) 
8.1 
(10.0)d) 
6.3 
(3.2)f) 
Labor 6.7 
(4.4)c) 
4.1 
(4.8)d) 
2.5 
(1.5)f) 
Combined factor 
productivity 
4.7 
(4.4)c) 
3.0 
(-1.0)d) 
3.3 
(1.5)f) 
Basic welfare differences +5.0 +4.5 -7.0 
Gini coefficient 0.25 0.21-0.26e) 0.40 
a) State socialist countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia; 
b) Capitalist countries: Greece, Ireland, Norway, and Spain; 
c) From 1954 to 1967;    d)  From 1940 to 1954, excluding the war years 1941 to 1945; 
e) Bulgaria and Poland;  f)   From 1911 to 1940, excluding the war years 1914 to 1918. 
Source: Horvat, B. (1982), The Political Economy of Socialism: A Marxist Social Theory, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 
pp. 203-205, tables 7, 8, and 9, op. cit. 
 
The Yugoslav self-management was more efficient in terms of output, labor, and 
combined factor productivity than capitalist and centrally planned economies during the 
same as well as different comparative periods. Centrally planned socialism was able to 
mobilize more capital but at a lower level of combined factor productivity or efficiency. 
Capitalism achieved efficiency but left other resources, especially labor, at the lowest 
level of use. It was so because in capitalism capital hires labor while in socialism 
(centralist or self-managed) the other way around applied. High growth rates in former 
Yugoslavia continued even after 1965, so for a period of more than two decades (from 
1952 to 1973) their annual average in percent terms was: 10.6 for output, 5.3 for labor, 
and 9.1 for capital (Estrin, 1983). 
The greatest achievement of self-management socialism was that it had quickly 
transformed former Yugoslavia from an obsolete and largely agricultural country to an 
industrialized and more developed economy and society compared to other socialist 
countries. However, the system through the defects in operation became vulnerable to a 
number of failures. When Estrin and Bartlett (1982) used a large empirical literature to 
identify the effects of enterprise self-management on Yugoslav economy, they showed 
that the efficiency had isolated the general impact of regional underdevelopment, 
market imperfections, and government regulation, though the growth performance 
appeared impressive by international comparisons. 
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2. Justifying the transformation of different types of property into private 
property   
 
 
 It is widely accepted that the firm’s efficiency depends on, or is subject to, a 
number of factors and the way they are structured within property rights. This gives rise 
to different objectives, constraints and incentives. Theoretical wisdom maintains that 
private enterprises pursue profit maximization and have strong incentives to reduce 
costs. On these grounds private property is judged to be more efficient over public and 
state property. State and public enterprises are regarded as less efficient for a number of 
reasons, including among others: i) political interference in enterprise affairs to pursue 
other objectives that politicians wants; ii) involvement of trade unions to lobby for 
higher wages for the workers; iii) employment of a greater number of employees than 
the firm actually may need; iv) lower quality of management and innovation due to 
limitations by the principal and absence of bankruptcy threat; v) less product 
differentiation and consumer oriented   (Martin and Parker, 1997). 
  
  Following theoretical foundations that private ownership does matter in terms of 
efficiency, a consensus that privatization will improve efficiency was generally 
supported. It was this expectation that gave rise to large scale privatization of POEs in 
the United Kingdom. The British privatization program might have appeared as 
inevitable to respond against ongoing decline in efficiency of public corporations, 
though Galal et al. (1994) argue that it was not a carefully planned and controlled 
program.  
   
  The necessity for privatization in CEE arose from similar reasons like in Britain. 
There were objections against centralist economy and state enterprises but privatization 
was not considered as long as former Soviet Union was able to crush the 1956 
Hungarian revolution and the 1968 Prague Spring in former Czechoslovakia, which 
probably could have led to an alternative way of socialism such as self-management, or 
in a more radical scenario, pave the way for privatization of state ownership. Transition 
and privatization eventually became inevitable by the end of 1980s or immediately once 
former Soviet Union withdrew defeated from the war in Afghanistan and was powerless 
to stop revolutions in its satellite states in CEE which broke simultaneously. It was 
impossible to maintain state ownership once the communist parties or the principals that 
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monitored enterprises collapsed and pluralist political parties emerged. Thereon the 
privatization process in CEE preceded by a disorganization of the system that imposed 
the need for reallocation of resources into property rights required by the market 
economy. For Blanchard (1997), this disorganization is the initial phase of transition 
that continues with reallocation of resources, and that reallocation involves restructuring 
and reorganization. Then the relation between property rights clearly defined and 
incentives becomes obvious. Roland (2000) reminded that different ownership per se 
has not played any important role in economic performance from the perspective of 
general equilibrium theory, but its role became central in economics once the theory of 
incomplete contracts was introduced, which in turn saw its relevance during 
privatization in transition economies in terms of control rights and residual rights.   
 
   
3. The necessity of redefining social ownership in former Yugoslavia and her 
successor states  
 
   Since its introduction in the early 1950s, the self-management system remained 
essentially unchanged till the initiation of market economy reforms in the late 1980s, 
although it underwent four important changes.4 The 1974 reform of contractual 
socialism resulted in an increase in the proportion of enterprise revenues being under 
the influence and control of state players. SOEs were under constant pressure by the 
authorities to employ more workers (Madžar, 1986). Under diminished autonomy of the 
workers, outside players by using their influence through residual rights violated the 
main principle of self-management ‘earning according to work’ by redistribution of 
revenues from better performing to under performing enterprises (Vodopivec, 1993). 
The implication of that redistribution as Freisner and Rosenman (2002) would show 
later was that whenever the government policies aimed at increasing the wealth of the 
society they could result in diminishing the enterprise efficiency over time. 
 
 
 
4 The main institutional changes and phases of the development of Yugoslav self-management were: (i) 
the period of centrally planned economy (1945-52) that was similar to the Soviet model of socialism; (ii) 
the introduction of self-management (1952-65), where the process of decision-making was gradually 
decentralized; (iii) the period of self-managed market socialism (1965-1974) when market mechanisms 
were utilized in as many areas as possible, focusing on the activities of the SOEs operating in the market; 
and (iv) the system of ‘free associated labor’ (1974-1988), or ‘contractual socialism’ (Estrin and Petrin, 
1991). 
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The residual rights of the state or government bodies over social ownership 
should also be seen from another point. They can serve as a reason for the government 
to interfere in the firm’s affairs, by which the firm’s efficiency is limited because the 
government may pursue different objectives referred to earlier in this paper. These 
problems are expected to disappear if of social ownership is transformed into private 
ownership, and LME moves to a full market economy. Any market economy requires 
the establishment of unambiguously defined, and most importantly, transferable 
property rights. However, the process of re-defining social ownership will be followed 
by claims from agents associated with SOEs (especially managers and workers), whose 
stake is not known. The workers believed that they have run SOEs, financed the 
investment expenditure, contributed to development and growth and thus had acquired 
ownership claims to the assets. On the other hand, when SOEs were not able to pay the 
minimum incomes of the workers or other claims on their income, they had to either 
merge with other profitable enterprises which would cover their losses, or accept the 
intervention by the state or the founding organization who would replace the existing 
management and restore the firm’s financial position (usually by subsidizing it). The 
state assisted SOEs by subsidies or rescued them from bankruptcy by writing off their 
debts, or SOEs in former Yugoslavia enjoyed soft budget constraints like state 
enterprises in CEE. This formed the basis of ownership claims by the state or the 
funding organization. 
 
During the 1980s the Yugoslav economy was in deep crisis facing 
hyperinflation, trade deficit, foreign debt, unemployment and inefficiencies at micro 
level. The policies aiming at reforming self-management were no longer producing 
effects as they were introduced as a reaction to correct the previous failures rather than 
moving towards any planned necessary reform before the crisis appeared (Prašnikar and 
Prašnikar, 1986). They seemed unlikely to produce substantial changes without 
changing the property rights regime.  It was decided to do so by the end of 1988 when 
the Federal Executive Council of former Yugoslavia brought in the reform to privatize 
social ownership and make transition towards a full market economy. Privatization of 
SOEs was facilitated through the Law on Social Capital (Official Gazette of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia No. 84/89 and 46/90), known as the Marković 
Law, named after Ante Marković, the last president of Federal Executive Council of 
former Yugoslavia. Very favorable terms were provided to employees to buy internal 
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shares; a discount of 30%, which was enhanced by another 1% for each year of 
employment – thus the overall discount could be as high as 70% of the nominal value of 
shares. Each employee could buy shares at a nominal value up to 3 times his/her annual 
personal incomes. The shares were to be paid for within 10 years once the company was 
registered under a different ownership form. The implementation of this privatization 
program was short lived as in 1991 interethnic conflicts began to give the final stroke to 
political and economic organization of former Yugoslavia and privatization of social 
ownership remained a challenge for newly established successor states.  
 
3.1 Methods of privatization largely similar 
 
Each newly independent republic of former Yugoslavia adopted their own 
privatization laws and established the relevant institutions – privatization agencies to 
carry out the process. The successor states, in general, opted for the sale of enterprise 
assets to insiders on very favorable terms as the main method of privatization, a pattern 
that, with modification was inherited from the Marković Law. Croatia was the first 
republic to pass its own privatization law while it was still part of the Yugoslav 
Federation, i.e. when the law on privatization already existed. Present and former 
employees were entitled to buy shares at a basic discount of 20% plus 1% for each year 
of employment, to be paid in installments over 5 years (later the deadline was extended 
to 20 years). In the 1991 Serbian Privatization Law the initial discount to employees 
was 20% plus 1% for each year of employment, so the overall discount could not 
exceed 60% of the total value of shares. Employees were required to fully pay the 
shares for a period of 5 years. In Montenegro, favorable terms and conditions to insiders 
were exactly the same in the Marković Law (basic discount of 30% plus 1% per each 
year of employment, the overall discount could not be higher than 70% of the appraised 
value of shares, repayment period of 10 years).  
 
Slovenia passed the law on privatization after independence, in November 1992 
respectively. Provisions of the Slovenian Law allocated social ownership to workers and 
society through the privatization scheme involving employees, the transfer of shares to 
the three funds, and citizens: 40% of the enterprises’ shares were to be transferred and 
allocated to the following three government funds: (i) 20% to the Development Fund; 
(ii) 10% to the Pension Fund; and (iii) 10% to the Restitution Fund. 20% of shares were 
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allocated to insiders (current and former employees and their relatives) in exchange for 
ownership certificates or vouchers; 20% was left at the discretion of the company to be 
sold to current employees, former employees and retired workers, and the remaining 
20% was allocated for mass privatization program (MPP) or free distribution of shares 
to Slovenian citizens in exchange for ownership certificates. A discount of 50% with a 
repayment period of 5 years applied to shares allocated to insiders.   
 
Despite becoming independent, Macedonia continued privatization that started 
on the basis of the Marković Law until 1993 when it enacted its own law on 
privatization. The Macedonian concept of privatization was based on a number of 
methods. Social capital was allocated in the following way: (i) 30% to employees as 
internal shares, involving a discount of 30% plus 1% for each year of employment, with 
a repayment period of 5 years; (ii) 15% of shares were transferred to the Pension Fund; 
and (iii) 55% of shares were to be sold to domestic and foreign buyers under equal 
conditions, using a variety of methods. 
 
Privatization of the renationalized social ownership proceeded under separate 
programs in the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and relied on a 
decentralized approach. In the Federation of BiH this was regulated with the approval of 
the Law on Privatization of Enterprises in December 1997. In Republika Srpska the 
Law on Privatization of State Capital in Enterprises was passed in June 1998. Both 
programs envisaged mass privatization by distribution of ownership certificates to the 
citizens over 18 years of age in the Federation, and vouchers to all citizens in Republika 
Srpska.5 The citizens could use the certificates or vouchers to buy shares in companies 
to be sold via public offerings, tenders and negotiations. 
 
The last federal unit of former Yugoslavia and the last country in CEE to pass its 
own law on privatization and embark on the process was Kosova. Despite the delay, the 
emerging transition, in particular the privatization of SOEs did not follow the pattern 
observed in other Yugoslav successor states, probably because Kosova became a 
specifically shaped problem. The methods of privatization as determined in the 
 
5 Large enterprises in Republika Srpska were required to transfer 10% of the state share capital to the 
Pension and Disabled Persons Fund, and 5% to Insurance Fund (Article 26 of the Law No. 24/98 of 
Republika Srpska).  
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regulation passed in June 2002 included: the establishment of subsidiary companies of 
SOEs (spin-offs) and, voluntary liquidation. The employees are entitled to 20% of the 
proceeds from the sale of SOEs as a compensation for the loss of their self-management 
rights after privatization.  A summary of all first privatization laws discussed so far in 
this section is provided in appendix to this paper.  
 
To sum up this section, the characteristics of social ownership related the 
priority of appropriation to those who were in charge of managing the SOEs. Uvalić 
(1997) identified the appropriation of those rights or privatization of social ownership 
synonymously with converting self-management rights into property rights, whereas the 
managing role of workers has been described by Medjad (2002) as a source of 
customary ownership rights.  There were exceptions or restrictions to these ownership 
rights to the workers anyway, e.g. privatization through MPP and direct sales either as 
primary or secondary method.   
 
3.2 Implementation of the privatization process: progress, pitfalls and setbacks   
 
Economists generally thought that the privatization of social ownership and the 
building of a market economy in former Yugoslavia would probably be easier than the 
privatization of state ownership in centrally planned economies. The Yugoslav system 
of market socialism was understood as something closer to a market economy and, as 
Tajnikar (2000) put it, ‘already market oriented’. Presumably, the longer experience 
with market-based elements was seen as an advantage in establishing a full market 
economy (Uvalić, 1992). As will be seen later, the privatization of social ownership 
came to be a more difficult task and required much time and effort. The blame has been 
laid mainly on the specific features of social ownership that distinguished it from state 
ownership. Legally, social ownership lacked precise definition under self-management 
and this only generated confusion about the meaning of property rights (Lavinge, 1999). 
 
Privatization under the Marković Law had started in almost every federal unit but 
was halted by the outbreak of civil wars and disintegration of the country. At the 
beginning of transition, privatization was autonomous and decentralized (conducted 
from the bottom). In Slovenia, around 400 SOEs embarked on autonomous privatization 
by selling shares to insiders (Korže, 1992). Once the Slovenian Law on Privatization 
was adopted, the process initiated under the Marković Law was stopped and ownership 
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transactions were re-examined. A similar process started by some SOEs in Croatia was 
not recognized and they were required to be privatized by the Croatian law only. The 
very short deadline for submitting applications for ownership transformation (14 
months) indicated apriori that all enterprises would not complete the process in time. 
Only few SOEs were assigned for ownership transformation and most of the 3,619 
SOEs remained in the state portfolio. Almost half of them were owned by Croatian 
Privatization Fund (CPF), creating a large state sector as a substitute for the social 
sector (Čučković, 1996). Privatization continued in phases that could not achieve 
anticipated objectives. After a decade of transition, privatization in Croatia remained 
incomplete. The year 2000 marked the beginning of the fourth phase with much 
remaining to be done. Among the reasons for slower privatization, was the fact that the 
CPF did not have sufficient operational and professional capacities for the most 
important sectors of the economy, namely shipbuilding and tourism (Čučković, 1995; 
Ostović, 1996). Privatization in Croatia in 2005 was still an ongoing process as the CPF 
continued to hold shares in hundreds of companies. 
 
Even though the Macedonian Law was enacted in 1993, it took 20 months to see 
the first SOE privatized under its provisions. That was due to the delays in building 
institutional capacities, in particular appointing the directors of the Agency for 
Privatization. Until then, over 400 enterprises (1/3 of total number of SOEs scheduled 
for privatization) had been transformed under the Marković Law (EBRD, 1995). 
Differently from Slovenia and Croatia, those transformations and privatizations were 
recognized. The rest of privatization under the Macedonian Law proceeded very slowly, 
and the fear that this will have adverse effects on enterprise performance and asset 
stripping, forced the government to make SOEs subject to compulsory privatization 
under a centralized process. Faster privatization was hindered by the economic 
sanctions of the United Nations against Serbia on one hand and the Greek embargo 
against Macedonia on the other, or the two most important trade partners of Macedonia 
(Muhić, 1996). The process was formally completed in 2002.  
 
The autonomous privatization that began under the Marković Law proceeded on 
a larger scale in Serbia than elsewhere in former Yugoslavia. Privatization was further 
advanced by the Serbian Law of 1991 so that by 1994 the process was completed in 
1,785 or in over 53% of total number of enterprises to be privatized. However, 1994 
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was the year where Serbia saw the biggest retreat in privatization. Reviewing the 
process by the Agency for Privatization resulted in the abolishment of privatization in 
1,556 or 87% of total number of privatized enterprises (Lazić and Sekelj, 1997). 
Revaluation because of hyperinflation of 1993 had not only blocked the process but led 
to the direct state control in enterprises where privatization was abolished and those to 
be privatized.6 
 
Until 1994 when the Montenegrin Law was amended, very little progress had 
been made. By the end of 1995, only 10 enterprises had been fully privatized to insiders 
(ISSP, 2000). This insignificant number was the reason why Montenegro did not stop 
the process in 1994 as in Serbia. Obviously, such a slow progress left Montenegro with 
the alternative of MPP, which had been used in Slovenia and Croatia to speed up 
ownership transformation and privatization. Although it was announced in 1996, MPP 
did not start until 2001. 
 
Privatization in BiH from the end of 1989 until 1991 had resulted in 585 SOEs 
being transformed by distribution and selling of a proportion of shares to employees, but 
none of them was fully privatized (Stojanov, 2002).  On that year, the newly elected 
authorities decided to review and halt the process with the reason that the companies 
were being sold cheaply. The halt followed re-nationalization of social ownership 
during the war (from 1992 to 1995) but the share capital paid by employees under the 
Marković Law was recognized and did not become subject to re-privatization since then 
(Bojičić-Dželilović et al., 2004). In Kosova, a dozen of SOEs in the Gjakova region that 
sold internal shares in the early 1990s remained with unclear ownership status as their 
shares paid for have not been recognized to the present day. Privatization of the rest of 
SOEs started in July 2003 under international administration, was halted in October of 
the same year and resumed after one year. The Kosova Trust Agency or the institution 
in charge to carry out the privatization planned to complete the process by mid-2005, 
though until the moment of writing or mid-2006 it has privatized only half of over 500 
SOEs, and that with enormous difficulties and controversies. Privatization in Kosova 
has proved to be the biggest challenge among CEE countries for the following reasons: 
 
6 During the 1993 hyperinflation in Serbia and Montenegro (the second highest in the world history) 
employees were highly motivated to buy enterprises very cheaply. By mid 1994 they were able to buy 
43% of total appraised value of social capital. After revaluation, the employees’ money paid for 
shareholding of 43% of social capital came down to just 3% to 5% (Filipović and Hadzić, 2005).   
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the undefined political status; ii) consequences of emergency measures introduced by 
Serbia in Kosova’s SOEs during the 1990s and Serbia’s attempts to legalize ownership 
claims made during that time; iii) problems with records of property rights; iv) too many 
stakeholders involved in managing the process (international administration, Kosova’s 
institutions, and Serbia); v) limited management capacities and non-transparency 
(Mulaj, 2005).   
 
 
3.3 The impact of privatization methods on corporate governance and 
restructuring   
 
After the difficulties referred to earlier regarding implementation, the 
completion of the privatization process did not mean the end of challenges. Privatization 
is not a formal transfer of property rights; it implies a change in enterprise behavior and 
incentives, management, and restructuring. Privatized enterprises needed to adopt their 
activity according to market conditions, something which they could not do within a 
night given their long operation under different conditions. Adapting to free market 
conditions depended on corporate governance or how the companies are managed and 
restructured after privatization.  
 
Corporate governance is determined by methods used in privatization. In 
companies where the sale of shares on favorable terms to insiders was used was the 
main method of privatization, ownership became dispersed among many individual 
shareholders in Employee-owned Firms (EOFs) with adverse implications on corporate 
governance. These group companies, now in private ownership, have their leadership 
largely similar to the past, or a continuation of pre-privatization period. The central 
decision-making organ under the previous system of self-management – the Workers’ 
Council – has been replaced by the Shareholders’ Assembly, now resting on many 
individual shareholders with the right of vote. A slight difference is the presence of 
managerial shareholders whose shares account for a little more than those of the average 
or lower position employees, derived from more allocation of shares based on the 
managers’ higher level of salaries.  
 
Dispersed ownership was also an obstacle to restructuring of the companies.  
Insiders lacked capital to invest while they were no longer enjoying subsidies after 
privatization. But restructuring is forced by the market conditions in which EOFs had to 
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survive. Consequently, EOFs underwent defensive restructuring through downsizing of 
enterprise activities such as, reducing costs by closing down unprofitable activities, job 
cuts, and getting rid of outdated and nonproductive technology, to the extent that 
enabled them to compete in the short run (Grosfeld and Roland, 1996). In the longer run 
they faced even more pressure from competition for greater efficiency, mainly from 
investor-owned companies. The need for greater enterprise restructuring and better 
corporate governance induces EOFs to sell their shares internally from workers to 
managers, and externally to the outside investors in the secondary privatization. Such a 
process happened in Slovenia with the aim to make dispersed ownership that resulted 
from privatization and MPP more concentrated. Simoneti, et al. (2001) who analyzed 
the changes and shifts in ownership concentration after secondary privatization in 426 
companies found that concentration occurred mainly from workers to managers but at a 
low level, having no major impact on enterprise performance.  
 
Corporate governance became a much worse problem for SOEs privatized 
through MPP, especially in BiH, and Montenegro. Too many citizens had no knowledge 
about the companies in which they became shareholders. In BiH the process neither 
contributed to economic recovery of the country nor attracted foreign investors as 
hoped. As many companies ended up in the hands of management and employees and 
the portfolio of Privatization Investment Funds (PIFs), dispersed ownership caused 
problems in corporate governance and the lack of fresh capital neglected restructuring 
(EBRD, 2003).  
Due to priority given to methods of privatization that favored insiders and 
population, foreign investors were left with little room to participate. In cases when they 
participated in privatization of SOEs wholly or partially, corporate governance and 
enterprise performance was better than in those privatized differently. For example, 
foreign participation brought positive changes in corporate governance by filling the 
gap of well-trained managers and incorporating better organization practices (Čengić, 
2001). The need for fresh capital was felt during privatization in Serbia and that was 
why the new law on privatization passed in 2001, and amended in 2003 envisaged cash 
sales as the primary method intending to attract strategic investors. 
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One would question if non-privatization could have been a better choice than 
privatization to insiders or to whatever owners that followed deterioration in enterprise 
performance? The answer is that non-privatization could have had higher costs and this 
has proven in many empirical studies across CEE comparing the performance of firms 
privatized through different methods and those non-privatized. The overwhelming 
majority of those studies found greater efficiency in privatized enterprises than non-
privatized ones in terms of corporate governance, restructuring, productivity and 
incomes. This remark was addressed by Uvalić (2001) to the delayed privatization in 
Serbia, that had SOEs been transformed into EOFs, the results could not have been 
worse.7 
 
4. Causes of smaller effects of privatization  
 
When the use of resources by a certain owner or under a given system of rules of 
managing property rights appears inefficient, Coase (1960) stood for incentives of 
transferring these rights to someone who will make a better use of them, i.e. achieve 
greater efficiency. One of the main requirements for that efficiency is to clearly define 
property rights and make them fully transferable, so competition would lead to efficient 
resource allocation. Sometimes it may be so and sometimes it may not.  Even in 
competition circumstances reallocation of resources may be inefficient due to 
asymmetric information. It is difficult to anticipate a better use of resources if there is 
insufficient information about their past and current qualities and shortcomings. This is 
something that featured social ownership during privatization and its aftermath.   
 
The limited privatization at the Federal level associated with the monetary 
stabilization began to produce some positive results which Marković himself had not 
expected, but he soon realized that the further success above all required the stability in 
political domain (Bennet, 1995). It was the political crisis and national question that led 
to disintegration of Yugoslavia, the consequences of which lengthened the transition to 
a market economy and made the completion of the privatization process more difficult. 
But not everything depended on external factors: there were plenty shortcomings within 
institutions that carried out the process.  
 
7 Of course, SOEs in better position had greater chances of being privatized earlier and this may question 
post-privatization better performance. However, time does matter in privatization; when it is well-
founded that it must happen, delays and/or alternatives may raise the costs, therefore should not be 
preferred to privatization. 
 18
4.1 External causes: the impact of disintegration of former Yugoslavia and 
thereafter   
  
 There is no doubt that the major factor that undermined prospects and results of 
privatization in successor states of former Yugoslavia (except Slovenia), is the breakup 
of the Federation that began in 1991 with the independence of northern republics – 
Slovenia and Croatia. Disintegration continued with the separation of Macedonia, the 
war in BiH (1992 to 1995) and, finally, the war in Kosova (1999), resulting in a 
complete disintegration of the Yugoslav market into republics and regions. These 
should be remembered as the initial conditions that deteriorated since the early 1990s, 
for which Prašnikar and Pregl (1991) warned and maintained that this transition 
depended on the resolution of the national question and democratic environment which 
would permit a successful implementation of the reform program. 
 
The initial conditions in Croatia – the most developed republic after Slovenia, 
deteriorated severely with the outbreak of war which left a significant adverse impact on 
the economy in general. Damages were equal to three times the annual GDP of Croatia 
(Buljan, 2001). The disadvantageous circumstances became even worse as Croatia 
redirected considerable and increasing proportion of its diminished resources to defense 
at the time it was establishing state institutions.8  
The civil war in BiH stopped the process at the beginning, which then did not 
resume until the end of 1997. MPP in BiH did not attract the broad participation of 
citizens. Ethnic controlled areas prevented minorities to participate in the process and 
use vouchers through PIFs. The low public confidence in the process, a high level of 
corruption among the main players, and the lack of interest by foreigners, were some of 
the characteristics of voucher privatization in BiH (Prašnikar et al. 2001).  
 
Regarding drastic economic decline during transition and privatization in CEE, 
Stiglitz (2002) blamed exposure to, or imposition of globalization and liberalization. 
Without attempting to look at pro et contra arguments about this notice, it is worth to 
emphasize that the opposite has caused the same in former Yugoslavia – isolation, that 
constrained and slowed down the progress of privatization. The very slow progress in 
Serbia and Montenegro during the 1990s was caused by: i) the United Nations’ 
 
8 At the height of war, the country with some 4 million inhabitants (excluding Serbs against whom it was 
fighting) had an army of 150,000 soldiers. In 1995 the share of military expenditure to GDP reached 9.4% 
(Bićanić, 2002).    
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sanctions; ii) the lack of foreign capital; iii) the sharp decline in economic activity; iv) 
poor experience and constraints to implement and control privatization; iv) the low level 
of information and non-transparent procedures (Vukotić, 2001). Despite that the war 
ended in 1995, Croatia was still a semi-isolated country by the end of the decade and 
that affected privatization progress and limited the chances of foreign investors to get 
involved in the process.   
  
 Under the impact of external factors on successor states such as the bloody 
collapse of former Yugoslavia, economic decline would have happened even without 
privatization. But what has impacted privatization as a process and enterprise 
performance afterwards, was the collapse of business networks and clusters not only 
with foreign countries, but also among the Yugoslav successor states. Such a disruption 
between federal units that became independent states was more costly for enterprises 
than say, republics of former Soviet Union, because, Yugoslav SOEs were organized on 
the system of associated labor and had their supply network and subsidiaries spread 
across federal units. Let alone war impact, privatization required reorganization and in 
peaceful time many of previous clusters could not be re-established as some enterprises 
in other successor states have gone bankrupt and/or reallocated resources dictated by the 
market forces.  
 
 
4.2 Internal environment: behavior of institutions and enterprises  
  
 It is obvious that managers and employees were the biggest beneficiaries of 
privatization where the sale of shares to insiders at favorable terms and conditions was 
used. However, the schemes of allocation of social ownership presented in section 3.1 
and summarized in appendix, often resulted in different ownership proportions after 
privatization. In Slovenia employees ended up with the same ownership share of 40% as 
allocated (Simoneti and Gregorić, 2004). In Macedonia they got a much better deal than 
in Croatia and ended up with a majority ownership stakes in slightly higher proportion 
of total number of SOEs than in Slovenia.  
 
Privatization after re-nationalization in Croatia was criticized for unfairness. 
Favoring narrower interests of the well-connected government officials and politicians 
of the ruling party that remained in power for nearly 10 years, led to social ownership 
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ending up largely in politicians and state funds as shareholders. The political capitalism 
in Croatia that emerged from this type of privatization became a cause of public 
dissatisfaction (Županov, 1997).9 Bičanić (2002) described this resulting group of 
political shareholders as crony capitalism. Something similar has happened in Serbia. 
After abolishing autonomous privatization the newly appointed directors of SOEs 
embarked on running enterprises fraudulently (Palairet, 2001). State officials became 
rich through corruption and economic crimes within nights at the expense of workers 
and the population (Karadjis, 2004). The public had suspicions that many of privatized 
SOEs through direct sale from 2001 onwards, ended in the hands of those who were 
believed to have earned their money during the 1990s through corruption and fraud 
(Maksimović, 2003). High level of corruption and politicization was the result of 
privatization in BiH, too.  
 
Inefficiencies and inexperience of institutions and policy makers to carry out 
privatization in a consistent way undermined the results significantly. The decision-
makers were able to make plans, thought they had the needed capacities and expertise to 
complete the process as planned, but did not pay attention to, if it goes wrong, then what 
should be undertaken? This rather has happened in a somehow ad hoc response to the 
problems that delayed completion of the process and made it more costly. It is actually 
happening in Kosova despite a good opportunity to learn very useful lessons.   
  
 
9 A public opinion poll in 1998 assessing the level of satisfaction with the privatization results showed 
that around 46.8% of the public were completely dissatisfied, 21.6% partially dissatisfied, 13.3% could 
not assess the results, 16.9% partially satisfied, and only 1.4% completely satisfied (Čučković, 1999). 
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5. Summary and conclusions  
 
In self-management socialism, two crucial aspects lacked sufficient and careful 
attention: i) social ownership and social property; and ii) the operation and behavior of 
SOEs in reality. Depending on the extent of their insights being blurry, they had 
implications in ownership claims against SOEs by various players. We summarize this 
by maintaining that, although things appear to work good but inside have got some 
defects not properly observed and dealt with in time, then when it comes to the 
problems accumulated, attempts to further reform the system (as former Yugoslavia did 
in mid 1980s) are likely to be without perspective. That is why the final role of the state 
in this respect – to organize privatization and make property rights clearly defined, came 
also to be an uneasy challenge. The longer experience with market-based elements 
being perceived as an advantage in establishing a full market economy, did not prove 
that the privatization of social ownership was easier than state ownership. The blame for 
this difficulty has been laid mainly on the specific features of social ownership and the 
problem of resolving the national question. Thus the prospects of privatization in former 
Yugoslavia soon withered away with the emergence of political crisis, the outbreak of 
the civil war and the disintegration of the country. 
 
The experience of privatization involves similarities as well as differences 
depending on approaches, methods used, and the circumstances in which the process 
evolved. The fact that the main method in the first privatization laws of successor states 
remained the sale of enterprise assets to insiders at favorable terms, indicates that the 
Marković Law left a significant impact which lasted long after the disintegration of 
former Yugoslavia, including some consequences of unfinished privatizations and their 
dilemma. But there were deviations from that course in many cases, e.g., when social 
ownership was renationalized before privatization (in Croatia, Serbia, and BiH), some 
SOEs were privatized through other methods (in Macedonia), or when a part was 
distributed to the population (MPP in Slovenia, Montenegro, and BiH). Privatization 
after re-nationalization in Croatia and Serbia generated a winners group made up of 
people well-connected to the government or the party in power. In both countries, 
privatization was associated with corruption. Although autonomous privatization had 
many shortcomings, its rescinding in Serbia was a worse option than continuing with it. 
This experience shows that in the course of transition the quicker privatization is carried 
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out the better, provided that the speed is cautious about the problems in corporate 
governance that may arise later.  
 
Privatization was undertaken to improve enterprise efficiency but fell far short 
of this aim. No doubt that there has always been a gap between the goals proclaimed 
and results achieved in privatization elsewhere. It does not mean that the plans were not 
good or they were overambitious. The main reason was the limited institutional 
capacities and management skills necessary to carry out the process. None of the 
countries had any experience of privatization and when it ran into difficulties, there was 
no experience or a ready diagnosis to deal with the problem effectively. Instead, other 
models were embarked on to cope with the problem and complete the process. This, 
indeed, accelerated and brought the process to an end though it left a number of 
implications behind.  
 
When we compare the management of SOEs in the past and after their 
privatization to employees or EOFs, we may conclude that it is similar at large. But in 
self-management, employees were not the only one managing SOEs; they had the 
support and influence of other players outside who acted as a sort of umbrella for 
employees. After privatization, the role of those players disappeared and employees 
being accustomed with that umbrella for a long time, found it difficult to do everything 
on their own. In cases when they came in joint ownership with other shareholders such 
as those who used to exercise their role in managing SOEs, there were difficulties 
because, in spite of being together again, their relations changed and different objectives 
emerged. Far more unsatisfactory performance came about when ownership was 
distributed to society (i.e. citizens) through MPP resulting in diffused ownership that 
weakened the mechanisms of corporate governance and prospects for restructuring. 
Foreign investment to support enterprise restructuring and improve corporate 
governance was smaller than expected. Two main factors may explain this: i) the overall 
political and economic environment; and ii) the large domination of insiders in the 
privatized companies which discouraged the participation of foreigners. 
  
 To sum up, the privatization of social ownership in successor states of former 
Yugoslavia faced many challenges. Political and institutional environment, in particular 
the disintegration of former Yugoslav market and the collapse of business networks had 
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a significant impact. Difficulties of each successor state to manage and carry out 
privatization reflected in unsatisfactory results. Smaller effects of privatization arose 
also from insufficient transparency during the process. One explanation with respect to 
the theory of unclear and/or shared ownership rights like in social ownership vis-à-vis 
its privatization, is that they are likely to produce results under incentive compatibility 
linked to some ideals of higher levels of broader interests enforced by an apparatus, than 
individual or group interests within the firms under better piecemeal incentives for some 
at the expense of some others. To answer the basic question in this paper, did 
privatization of social ownership matter for economic efficiency, the answer is: not in 
the short to medium term. This by no means implies was then privatization necessary? 
Privatization was a must, but the way how it was implemented and managed 
undermined greater results. This now leads to another question: which ownership does 
matter more in terms of overall economic efficiency? From historical perspective that 
depends on how well ownership fits in the economic system and broader environment 
such as political and institutional stability.   
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Appendix I: Privatization in successor states of former Yugoslavia: methods, progress, and post-privatization results   
 Slovenia Croatia Macedonia Serbia Montenegro Bosnia and Herzegovina Kosova 
Total number of SOEs slated for 
privatization  
2,500a) 3,619b) 1,216c) 3,486d) 354e) 2,591f) 558 g) 
Year and the month the first 
privatization law was passed 
November 1992 April 1991 June 1993 August 1993 January 1992 December 1997 and 
June 1998  
June 2002 
Approaches to privatization Decentralized Highly centralized Decentralized Centralized Decentralized Highly decentralized Highly centralized 
Primary method of privatization  Employee buy-
outs 
Employee buy-outs Employee buy-outs Employee buy-outs Employee buy-outs MPP Direct sales (spin-off)
Secondary method of privatization MPP MPP Direct sales None MPP Direct sales Liquidation  
Transfers to the funds   40%h) 30%i) 15%j) 40%k) Up to 60%l) 15% (RS)m) None  
Discount for insiders 50%h) 20%i) 30-50%j) 20%k) 30%l) None  None 
Additional discount per each year of 
employment  
None 1%i) 1%j) 1%k) 1%l) None  None 
Maximum discount to insiders 50%h) 60%i) 70%-90%j) 60%k) 70%l) None  20%o) 
Repayment period 5 yearsh) 5 years (20 years in the 
second phase)i) 
5 yearsj) 5 yearsk) 10 yearsl) None  None  
Limits on sales of internal shares per 
employee (DM) 
None 20,000i) 25,000j) 20,000-30,000k) 18,000l) None None 
Progress with large scale privatization 
during the 1990s  
 Significant Moderate Moderate  Significant until 1994, 
retreat and no progress until
2002  
Very slow Very slow or no progress No progress 
Slow since 2002 
Corporate governance Moderate  Weak   Poor  Very poor Very poor Very poor n/a 
Enterprise restructuring  Moderate   Little    Little  Very little Very little  Very little or no 
restructuring 
n/a 
Private sector share to GDP (2002)n) 65% 60% 60% 45% n/a 45% n/a 
Privatization revenues as a share of 
GDP (in 2002)n) 
4.9% 15.8% n/a n/a  n/a 2.9% n/a 
Sources: 
a) EBRD (1994);       b) Čučković (1996);         c) Privatization Agency of Macedonia (2002a);         d) Lazić and Sekelj (1997);       e) Bojović and Vlahović, 2002; 
f) Privatization Agency of the Federation of BiH and of Republika Srpska (2003);           g) Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia (1990) 
h) Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 55/92, Articles 22, 23, and 25;            i)Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia,  No. 84/92, Articles 25 and 31; 
j) Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No. 38/93, Articles 26 and 28;            k) Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 48/91, Articles 16 and 17; 
l) Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro, No. 2/92, Articles 7, 8, 9 and 11;             m) Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska No. 24/98, Article 26;        
n)      EBRD (2002);       
o)      Not a discount but the share of proceeds from the sale of SOEs going to workers according to provisions of the Regulation No. 2002/2 on the establishment of the Kosova Trust 
Agency on 13 June 2002 by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (Michael Steiner) was the first serious step in this process. The Regulation was amended on 22 April 
2005 by Regulation No. 2005/18;  
         and author’s own compilation.
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